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The dynamic response process to conflicting institutional demands in MNC 
subsidiaries – An inductive study in the Sub-Saharan African e-commerce sector 
Plain language summary: How do subsidiary managers react when their headquarters have 
requests that conflict with the local environment in which they operate? Using data on a 
subsidiary based in Sub-Saharan Africa and headquartered in Europe, we show that subsidiary 
managers need more time than usually expected to react to headquarters demands. Subsidiary 
managers sometimes postpone or test headquarters demands before deciding how to respond. In 
addition, subsidiary managers can implement headquarters demands in ways that do not fit 
expectations from the headquarters or local actors (e.g. customers, suppliers), thus resulting in 
additional delays. Headquarters managers must be aware that implementation can take longer 
than they anticipate, particularly for subsidiaries located in environments that differ 
substantially from the environment of the headquarters.  
 
Technical summary: In this paper, we examine responses to the conflicting institutional 
demands faced by an e-commerce subsidiary located in Sub-Saharan Africa and headquartered 
in Europe. Following an inductive approach, we gathered data from a 6-month participant-
observation study and interviews with local managers. Our findings show that the subsidiary 
responded to conflicting institutional demands in a dynamic way, taking one response after the 
other. In some cases, the subsidiary responded in a way that they thought would be satisfactory 
but subsequent pressures from their headquarters or their local environment pushed them to 
adopt a new response. In other cases, the subsidiary intentionally adopted responses knowing 








Subsidiaries of multinational corporations (MNCs) are embedded in both the internal context of 
the MNC and the external context in which they operate (Meyer, Mudambi and Narula, 2011; 
Narula, 2014). Each context has specific requirements and it can be challenging for subsidiaries 
to cope with situations where demands emanating from their headquarters are conflicting with 
demands from their local environments (Marano and Kostova, 2016; Saka-Helmhout, Deeg and 
Greenwood, 2016). This situation of conflicting institutional demands is a particular form of 
institutional complexity referred to as institutional duality (Hillman and Wan, 2005; Kostova and 
Roth, 2002).  
Extant literature is very informative with regard to the potential responses to conflicting 
institutional demands (see Kostova and Roth, 2002; Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010; 
2013). Yet, little attention has been given to the idea that responses to conflicting institutional 
demands can develop over time. Frequently, it has been explicitly or implicitly assumed that 
organizations employ a single response to a conflicting demand (Greenwood et al., 2011). 
Thereby, most of the literature has neglected the possibility that organizations might need time to 
address conflicting institutional demands and make adjustments to their responses (Greenwood 
et al., 2011; Raaijmakers et al., 2015; Tilcsik, 2010). Thus, there is a need to further examine the 
response process of MNC subsidiaries when they confront institutional duality, including how 
subsidiaries manipulate, negotiate and make sense of the institutional pressures they face 
(Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2016; Greenwood et al., 2010; Tempel et al., 2006; Zilber, 2011).  
More and more foreign e-commerce firms are entering the African continent, being attracted 
by the growth potential offered by leap frogging (Manyika et al., 2013). However, there are still 
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several challenges to be overcome before firms can benefit from the e-commerce sector in Africa 
(UNCTAD, 2015; Forbes, 2014). For instance, the ratio of e-transactions paid by cash on 
delivery is still at about fifty percent in Africa, while this number drops to only eleven percent in 
Asia Pacific and five percent in Europe (WorldPay, 2011). In addition, the institutional logic of 
e-commerce firms makes it particularly challenging for their African subsidiaries to successfully 
overcome these local challenges. Indeed, managers in e-commerce firms have a global mindset 
and look for rapid scalability of their business models, while the African continent still requires 
extensive adaptation. This makes it likely that headquarters will address their subsidiaries with 
demands that are at odds with the local environment and to which subsidiary managers will not 
know how to respond. Not only can these conflicting demands lead to frictions in the 
subsidiaries, but recent examples show that foreign e-commerce firms are now closing some of 
their African subsidiaries, e.g. CDiscount’s exist from Senegal and Cameroon (Jeune Afrique, 
2016). As foreign investments in the African e-commerce sector represent a strong opportunity 
for the development of the continent, we need to understand how subsidiaries react when faced 
with headquarters demands that conflict with the local environment.  
We followed an inductive approach and used data from participant-observation notes, 
interview transcripts, and email exchanges to address our research question. We focused on the 
response process to conflicting institutional demands from the emanation of the demands to the 
response that ultimately addressed it. By conducting a multiple case analysis of the twelve 
different response processes, we are able to shed light on this phenomenon. We studied an MNC 
subsidiary for which the institutional context differed substantially from the one of their 




Our findings suggest that the response process to conflicting institutional demands can be 
dynamic, i.e. that more than one response might be needed to satisfy all actors. In some cases, 
the subsidiary managers adopted responses that they thought would be satisfactory for both 
internal (headquarters) and external (local environment) actors. However, the subsidiary was 
later pressured by these actors to reconsider their initial response and adopt another one. In these 
cases, the dynamism of the response process emerged from outside of the subsidiary. In other 
cases, the subsidiary managers intentionally adopted responses knowing that these would not 
satisfy all actors and that they would have to reconsider their initial response by adopting a new 
one. Two types of responses were used in these latter cases, namely postponing and testing. Both 
these responses were used to gather information and / or to negotiate with internal and external 
actors. The subsidiary managers used postponing to actively delaying the response to the 
headquarters demand. Postponing was used when the subsidiary managers were uncertain about 
the feasibility of the headquarters’ demand, given the local institutional context. The subsidiary 
managers used testing in order to try responding to the demand when they were motivated to 
comply with it but unsure about how to do so, given the local institutional context.  
Our study contributes to the management literature in three ways. First, we extend the 
literature on responses to institutional complexity (e.g. Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010). 
Our findings build on a recent argument by Greenwood and colleagues (2011) according to 
which most of this research has neglected the possibility of cycles of organizational responses 
and variability over time. We directly address this gap by showing that organizational responses 
can follow a dynamic process (i.e. response 1 followed by response 2, etc.) that can emerge from 
outside pressures or be intended by the subsidiary (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). We also extend 
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the existing typology of responses by identifying two novel response categories previously 
unspecified by the literature (testing and postponing).  
Second, we contribute to the literature applying institutional theory to the study of MNCs (e.g. 
Kostova and Roth, 2002; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). We follow Kostova and colleagues (2008) 
by integrating ideas from both new and old institutionalism (see also Hirsch and Lounsbury, 
1997) and showing that instead of static fields, we see dynamic ones that are the product of 
continuous interactions. We also provide empirical support for the proposition made by Durand 
and Jacqueminet (2015) that MNC subsidiaries might try to accommodate internal and external 
actors with other responses than compliance.  
Third, we add to our understanding of the management of foreign e-commerce subsidiaries in 
Africa. We add to the recent discussion on knowledge of institutions as a firm-specific asset of 
MNCs (Narula, 2014) in showing that it might be particularly difficult for nascent MNCs to 
grasp local market specificities, thus leading to conflicting institutional demands and frictions in 
the subsidiaries. We also generalize our findings to subsidiaries located in emerging markets and 
address the suggestion by Kostova, Nell and Hoenen (2016) that subsidiaries in markets with less 
developed institutions follow a subsidiary-focused institutional logic.  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands 
MNC subsidiaries are embedded both internally in the MNC and externally in the local 
environment in which they operate (Meyer et al., 2011; Narula, 2014). This implies that they 
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have to manage their legitimacy vis-à-vis actors located in different institutional environments 
(Suchman, 1995). When demands emanating from their headquarters and their local partners are 
conflicting, managing legitimacy vis-à-vis both actors can be especially challenging (Brenner 
and Ambos, 2013). Indeed, complying with one of the demands implies neglecting the other one 
(Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). In particular, complying with a demand from the headquarters that 
conflicts with the local institutional context means that the subsidiary will face more difficulties 
in reaching and/or maintaining legitimacy with its local environment, and vice versa. Thus, when 
subsidiaries are faced with conflicting institutional demands, they often adopt other responses 
than simple (non-)compliance (Durand and Jacqueminet, 2015; Kostova and Roth, 2002; Nell et 
al., 2015). Alternative organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands include 
compromise, manipulation, decoupling, selective coupling, and non-compliance (see the 
overview in Table 1). Each of these responses will be explained in more detail below.  
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
When faced with conflicting institutional demands, organizations might compromise, i.e. 
trying to accommodate all actors by partially complying with all institutional demands (Kraatz 
and Block, 2008; Oliver, 1991). There are different tactics through which organizations can 
follow a compromise response (Oliver, 1991). For example, organizations can try to balance the 
sources of the conflicting demands by playing them against each other or try to employ a 
pacifying tactic and comply with only the minimum standards of what is expected. Another 
tactic is to bargain with the sources of conflicting demands for a compromise and thereby obtain 
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concessions that reduce the actual scope of compliance. Microfinance organizations provide a 
good illustration of compromise between the banking logic, which demands to set high interest 
rates to maximize profit, and the development logic, which demands to set low interest rates to 
reduce the burden on poor clients (Battilana and Dorado, 2010). By setting interest rates below 
the banking logic’s expectations and above the development logic’s expectations, they partially 
comply with both demands (Pache and Santos, 2013).  
Manipulation describes an active attempt to change the content of a conflicting institutional 
demand or to influence its sources (Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010). Tactics in this 
category include co-optation, influence, and control. An MNC which is active in the oil industry 
can for example co-opt or absorb the source of a conflicting institutional demand by inviting an 
environmental non-profit organization to join its board of directors. This may eventually 
neutralize conflicting demands. Organizations can also try to lobby and thus influence different 
institutionalized values and beliefs (Oliver, 1991). Finally, controlling is a more radical tactic 
that aims to control the source of the conflicting demand. By changing the way in which 
organizations convey their achievements and misconduct to the public, for instance, they can 
directly control the source of the pressure. 
Organizations can also respond by decoupling when they try to avoid conformity. Oliver 
(1991) presented three tactics by which organizations might follow a decoupling response. First, 
organizations can engage in window-dressing whereby they symbolically pretend to comply but 
actually do not. Even if the compliance is not real in this case, it is often enough for 
organizations to maintain legitimacy. For example, MNC subsidiaries can decouple by 
displaying a variety of activities when headquarters managers are on site although these practices 
are not part of the normal routines. Second, buffering denotes that organizations can try to reduce 
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the extent of scrutiny by partially dissociating their activities from external contact (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). According to the third tactic presented by Oliver (1991), which is perhaps the 
most extreme one, organizations may escape the domain in which a pressure is exerted 
(Hirschman, 1970) or modify their own goals or activities to avoid the necessity to comply. 
When MNC subsidiaries are faced with changes in local regulations that conflict with MNC-
wide practices, headquarters can for example decide to relocate their activities in locations where 
these practices will not be conflicting with local regulations. In addition, Kostova and Roth 
(2002) reported evidence of ceremonial adoption as a way of decoupling in which MNC 
subsidiaries implement corporate practices without becoming committed to them or seeing them 
as beneficial.  
Pache and Santos (2013) more recently presented selective coupling as another response to 
conflicting institutional demands. In an inductive case study of four hybrid organizations, they 
showed that organizations can combine different intact elements from conflicting demands to 
simultaneously satisfy all sets of actors. For example, one of the four organizations under 
investigation combined intact elements of the commercial logic such as choosing a for-profit 
legal status with elements of the social welfare logic such as choosing not to distribute dividends 
to the shareholders.  
Non-compliance is another response to conflicting institutional demands (Oliver, 1991; Pache 
and Santos, 2013). More specifically, it denotes the explicit rejection of at least one of the 
institutional demands. Organizations can simply dismiss or ignore certain demands when the 
potential for external enforcement of a demand is perceived to be low, when the organization is 
not dependent on the source of the demand, or when internal objectives dramatically diverge 
from the demand. Organizations might also pursue more active tactics and directly challenge 
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demands in contesting rules and requirements or even attack the sources of institutional 
demands.  
The literature has mainly focused on the typology of different organizational responses to 
conflicting institutional demands while only little attention has been paid to the implementation 
of these responses. Some recent studies, however, have looked into the response process in more 
detail and gave interesting insights (e.g. Crilly, Zollo and Hansen, 2012; Raaijmakers et al., 
2015).  
The dynamics of organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands 
Researchers have shown that organizations sometimes take time to address conflicting 
institutional demands and that the response process can be dynamic. (Non-)compliance, for 
instance, was found to be a time-consuming process. In particular, Raaijmakers and colleagues 
(2015) found that early compliance happened in situations of low institutional complexity. In 
situations of moderate or high complexity, decision makers took time to address the demand. 
Time was used for either one of two purposes. First, time was used as a buffering resource and 
decision makers waited to see whether / how the situation would resolve. Second, time was used 
as a resource for action, to influence the sources of institutional demands, or experiment 
compliance with the demand in order to solve technical issues. In addition, using a context in 
which most organizations are not complying with formal regulations (the Nigerian film 
industry), Uzo and Mair (2014) studied why organizations choose to comply with informal rules 
when formal ones exist. They found that non-compliance was not a static decision of 
organizations, but the outcome of a continuously (re-)negotiated process.  
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Moreover, individuals also need time to follow a decoupling response. Tilcsik (2010) for 
example shed light on the intra-organizational processes that precede decoupling and presented a 
stepwise road to decoupling. After institutional demands have emerged or intensified, 
organizations evaluate the desirability of adopting them. If they decide that complying is 
undesirable but formally necessary, the organizations will eventually decouple. Hence, the 
decoupling response arose from a process that had developed over time. Similarly, Crilly and 
colleagues (2012) found two pathways to decoupling when they studied institutional demands for 
the adoption of corporate social responsibility practices in MNCs. They identified evasive 
decoupling, which referred to decoupling as a deliberate choice from managers to conceal non-
compliance with the demands. Furthermore, emergent decoupling referred to cases of low 
consensus among internal actors and external stakeholders (e.g. NGOs, customer associations) 
that led to situations of complexity that cultivated resistance to the demands. In other words, 
decoupling was not always an intended response from the managers. Sometimes, it was the result 
of a process that comprised of learning efforts and inconsistent and changing demands from both 
internal and external actors. 
Moreover, some scholars have recently focused on the dynamic response process of 
recoupling (e.g. Bromley and Powell, 2012; Hallett, 2010). The recoupling process starts with a 
decoupling state in which the organization is symbolically complying with the demand, and 
evolves until the organization actually complies with the demand. Egels-Zanden (2014) showed 
evidence of the process of recoupling by looking at the evolution of Chinese toy suppliers’ 
compliance with MNC guidelines. While the organizations under study were decoupling the 
guidelines from their actual practices in 2004, they had recoupled the guidelines and their 
practices and thus complied with almost all requirements by 2009. In addition to his finding of a 
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road to decoupling, Tilcsik (2010) also investigated what happens after organizations took a 
decoupling response and identified another process that eventually led to actual compliance with 
the same demand.  
Altogether, most of the literature has investigated and appreciated different organizational 
responses to conflicting institutional demands, while directly or indirectly assuming that these 
responses were single and sustainable ones.  Some notable exceptions described empirical cases 
in which organizational responses followed a process that developed over time and was dynamic 
in that one response led to another. Yet, how the response process unfolds over time deserves 




Some aspects are important to consider when deciding on a research setting to study MNC 
subsidiary reactions to institutional duality. Indeed, situations of institutional duality are more 
likely to occur when the regulative, normative, cognitive, and industrial characteristics of the 
subsidiary’s environment differ from those of the headquarters. In addition, the more these two 
environments differ, the less straightforward it will be for the subsidiary to respond to conflicting 
demands emanating from its headquarters.  
The MNC under investigation in this study is headquartered in Berlin, Germany, and operates 
an online platform specializing in the home delivery of restaurant meals. The subsidiary we 
studied was located in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire and had been active for less than two years when 
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we started our data collection. The environments of the subsidiary and of the headquarters differ 
in many aspects. For instance, judicial decisions are less timely and independent in Cote d’Ivoire 
than in Germany, and the informal economy is more prevalent in Cote d’Ivoire (Institutional 
Profiles Database, 2012). Moreover, diverging habits and values between both environments are 
expressed by strong differences in corruption perception, long-term orientation, and 
individualism (Hofstede, 2015; Transparency International, 2015). By referring to difference 
within the same industry, it is notable that the most important drivers of growth of the e-
commerce sector (i.e. internet access, online payment, and delivery systems) are, despite recent 
improvements, still in an early development stage in some regions of the African continent 
(UNCTAD, 2015). More specifically, for example, almost fifty percent of e-transactions are paid 
by cash on delivery in Africa, while this number drops to only eleven percent in Asia Pacific and 
is as low as five percent in Europe (WorldPay, 2011). Similarly, the ratio of the population 
having mail delivered at home is approximately four times higher in Asia or Europe than in 
Africa (Universal Postal Union, 2014). Such challenges relating to infrastructure are particularly 
salient in Sub-Saharan Africa, where e.g. internet penetration is at about sixteen percent, as 
opposed to thirty-two percent in Asia or seventy-five percent in Europe (Manyika et al., 2013), 
and where the ratio of paved roads remains six times smaller than in the European Union and 
three times smaller than in South Asia (World Bank, 2011). 
A number of examples highlight that challenges of institutional duality arise due to the 
differences in institutional landscapes stated above. The headquarters of the German e-commerce 
platform Jumia, for example, would like to increase the share of online payments on the African 
continent. However, most of the payments to its Nigerian subsidiary are still made by cash-on-
delivery and processing these payments is an expensive solution for the subsidiary (The New 
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Yorker, 2016). Other challenges occurred in Jumia’s Ivorian subsidiary where the managers had 
difficulties finding reliable sub-contractors to ensure the delivery of their goods (The Economist, 
2016). In addition, the Senegalese and Cameroonese subsidiaries of the French e-commerce firm 
Cdiscount have not been able to reach headquarters’ growth targets, because of the challenges of 
counterfeit and customs charges. After only two years of activity, the headquarters decided to 
close down both subsidiaries (Jeune Afrique, 2016). 
Despite the strong differences between the two environments, the headquarters of the MNC 
under investigation follow a global strategy in which standardized processes and solutions are 
transferred from the global headquarters and the subsidiaries have a clear implementation 
function. In addition, most members of the top management team in the headquarters are home- 
or third-country-nationals who push for a performance-driven culture in which implementation 
and growth must be rapid. As a result, the MNC has been rapidly expanding internationally and 
is present in 40 countries after only nine years of existence. Yet, the MNC in our case is still in 
an early development stage. Such nascent MNCs tend to lack experience about how and when to 
build standard platforms and to step back (see e.g. Narula, 2012). In sum, the subsidiary under 
investigation is likely to face conflicting institutional demands emanating from their 
headquarters and to which it might not know how to respond. Thus, this subsidiary presents a 
fruitful context to investigate the response process to conflicting demands in MNC subsidiaries.  
Data collection  
Literature on MNC subsidiary responses to conflicting institutional demands lacks a clear theory 
on the development of such responses over time. Therefore, thick description, exploratory 
research, and case analysis are suitable to address this issue (Birkinshaw, Brannen and Tung, 
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2011; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). In particular, as we want to explore a complex phenomenon 
that requires deep insights of the research context, ethnography proved to be a suitable method 
(Klingebiel and Stadler, 2015; Moore, 2011). Consequently, we conducted our study by using 
participant-observation data collected in an MNC subsidiary operating in the e-commerce sector 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. We used multiple case studies and our level of analysis was the 
subsidiary response process to conflicting demands (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Welch et 
al., 2011). It was important that all the cases studied were within the same headquarters-
subsidiary dyad to ensure that variation in responses were due to variation of situations and not 
of organizational contexts.  
Data collection started in June 2014 and ended in March 2015. One of the authors acted as the 
field researcher and took notes on the general theme of headquarters-subsidiary relationships two 
to four times a week. This helped keep the inductive and data-driven nature of the study. Primary 
data was collected through the method of participant-observation, semi-structured interviews, 
correspondence via email, intra-organizational chat conversations, text messages, as well as 
internal documentation. Secondary data on both the internal MNC environment and on the 
subsidiary local environment was used in preparing for the fieldwork. Information about the 
local market was gathered before entering the field. Information about the company and the 
business model was collected using the website of the company, press articles, and online videos. 
This enabled a quicker assimilation of the field researcher to the Ivorian context and supported a 
better understanding of the information collected. Participation and observation phases can be 




INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
During six months, the field researcher was directly involved in the process of responding to 
and / or solving situations of conflicting institutional demands, giving her access to deep 
underlying elements that would not have been accessible through other research methods. The 
first two months were mainly explorative and helped the researcher get accustomed to the 
subsidiary environment, helped defining her role within the firm and gain an overview of the 
relationships in the local team. The headquarters were abnormally involved during weeks seven 
and eight of the study, resulting in movements in the relationship between the subsidiary and the 
headquarters. Nevertheless, the researcher was able to settle in the new country, to become 
acquainted to certain local customs, language differences, and daily practicalities. Moreover, 
within the subsidiary, she took on her management role in the team and built trust in order to 
reach complete participation and become a member of the group. These introductory first months 
were beneficial to reach both a better understanding of the setting and broader responsibilities in 
the activities of the firm. The researcher had the ability to look at different areas of the 
subsidiary. Notes were gathered within the different departments, namely sales, partner 
management, operations, and marketing. A number of written documents were also used as part 
of the observation work and the field participation. 
Selection of interviewees 
Interviews within the subsidiary were conducted with the other managers who also had frequent 
interactions with both the headquarters and the local environment. More specifically, the local 
general manager (third country national) and the marketing manager (host country national) were 
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interviewed. Semi-structured interviews of approximately 40 minutes each were conducted 
shortly after the participant-observation phase. The interviews helped triangulate the information 
collected during the participant-observation phase (notes and emails). The semi-structured nature 
of the interviews permitted to retain the openness of the conversation while keeping the scope of 
the study on institutional duality occurrence and the responses to it (Yin, 1994). Using semi-
structured interviews also facilitated laddering follow-up questions, which were raised in the 
search of revealing objectives and values of the interviewees. 
Interviews were held in French, the local language of Cote d’Ivoire. After being transcribed, 
they were translated into English to enable consistency in terms, and facilitate the analysis and 
the emergence of patterns. Several measures were taken in order to minimize the loss of meaning 
in the translation process (Van Nes et al., 2010). First, the interviews were translated by a French 
and English bilingual researcher who had experience in translation. This helped understand 
French expressions and translating them to the best colloquial form in English. Second, in all 
cases of doubts on the meaning of interview data of the translated version, the researcher went 
back to the source language to validate the codes and findings in English. 
Confidentiality 
During the extensive period of participant-observation, the researcher was exposed to sensitive 
data through close trusting relationships, revealing a multitude of elements of which employees 
might be conscious or unconscious of. We therefore made our data anonymous in order to 
protect the firm’s information as well as the individuals who participated in our study. The 
anonymity concerns the identity of the MNC, of the subsidiary, and of all employees mentioned 
in the study.  
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Data analysis  
To maintain the inductiveness of the data and the data-driven nature of the study, no coding 
categories were created before the data collection. Once the data was gathered, a line-by-line 
approach was used as the initial step of analysis for both the field notes and the interviews 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990). This method is claimed to force analytical thinking while remaining 
closely bound to the data (Gibbs, 2008). During this process, code notes were retrieved in order 
to keep track of all categories, hypotheses, and generative questions that emerged from the 
analytical process (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).  
The data was then categorized into four sections: headquarters demands, local pressures, 
response(s) and motivations behind the response(s). These categories enabled us to obtain a first 
layer of findings and helped avoid ‘death by data asphyxiation’ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 540). Field 
notes and interviews were categorized under these labels. Conflicts that did not enter the scope of 
our paper were disregarded. For instance, one conflict emerged because of the personal 
ambitions of employees of the subsidiaries, even though the headquarters directive seemed to fit 
the local institutional context. After cross-checking the pertinence of processes and filtering the 
conflicts that were not relevant, we retained 12 cases of conflicting institutional demands and 
their associated response processes. An additional step of analysis led to the emergence of 






‘I need to satisfy… or maybe not satisfy, but everyone comes with reasonable arguments, 
so it’s not always easy.’ – Interview Jim [subsidiary marketing manager] 
Our findings offer insights into the response process that MNC subsidiaries follow when they 
face conflicting institutional demands. While we do find cases in which the response processes 
were single and sustainable, the response processes were dynamic in most of the cases. In some 
cases, we find that the dynamism of the response process was emergent and pushed by internal 
or external pressures. In other cases, the responses were adopted with the intention of being 
modified later on and the dynamism of the response processes was thereby here intended. Table 
3 shows an overview of the different cases.  
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
Sustainable response processes 
Case 1. The headquarters requested that the subsidiary uses GPS trackers on their delivery staff. 
The arguments behind this demand were twofold. First, the headquarters argued that it would 
accelerate the journey to the partner restaurants to collect the meals and to the customers to 
deliver the meals. Second, the GPS trackers would allow the company to monitor the delivery 
staff and to optimize the routes. Both delivery and office staff expressed reluctance to use the 
GPS system and argued that it would not be helpful. In Cote d’Ivoire, it is still common to 
indicate locations by using nearby buildings (e.g. the blue house next to the big supermarket). 
Consequently, delivery and office staff are not accustomed to using maps and customers often 
indicate their locations without giving a regular address. The subsidiary managers concluded that 
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it would not increase efficiency as argued by the headquarters and decided to dismiss the demand 
(non-compliance response). The headquarters did not mention this demand again during the 
participant-observation phase and the interviews conducted ex-post did not indicate that the 
subsidiary had to adapt their initial non-compliance response. 
Case 2. The headquarters requested that the subsidiary sign contracts focusing in priority on 
the fast-food restaurants as they were the ones getting the most attention from the customers. The 
transport infrastructure was a big hurdle that needed to be overcome in order to comply with the 
headquarters demand. Indeed, the recurrent and intense traffic jams in Abidjan would have made 
it particularly time consuming for the subsidiary to travel from one fast-food restaurant to the 
other, as they were dispersed throughout the city. Instead, focusing on geographic areas was a 
much more efficient way of travelling to the different restaurants.  
‘Sarah [headquarters manager] asked me on Skype today if we had managed to get all the 
fast-food restaurants yet. I told her that we had signed some, but not all of them. She asked 
me again to only sign these partners, and to make them a priority. I talked to Mary 
[subsidiary general manager] about this, and since they are spread out around the city, we 
decided to continue as we are doing. We’ll just try to give Sarah an increasing number of 
fast-food restaurants, so that she can be satisfied.’ – Participant-observation notes, week 
17 
The subsidiary told the headquarters that it was complying with the demand although it was 
not. As a result, the subsidiary managers followed a concealment tactic in disguising non-
compliance with the demand (decoupling response). 
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Case 3. Willing to increase the service offering of the subsidiary, the headquarters asked the 
subsidiary to also include wine dealers in its portfolio. Half of the delivery staff expressed 
embarrassment related to the fact that their religion did not allow them to transport alcohol. 
Complying with the headquarters demand would have resulted in frictions with the workforce 
and motivational issues. As a result, the subsidiary decided not to include wine dealers in its 
portfolio. The subsidiary followed a dismissal tactic and simply ignored the headquarters 
demand (non-compliance response). The notes and emails from the participant-observation phase 
as well as the ex-post interviews did not indicate that the headquarters were subsequently 
contesting this non-compliance.     
Emergent dynamism in the response processes 
Case 4. As part of a global marketing campaign, the headquarters requested the subsidiary to 
distribute flyers in the shape of door-hangers in apartment buildings. While the subsidiary 
managers were initially motivated by the idea, the local institutional environment made it 
difficult to comply with the demand. As a result of years of conflicts and political instability, the 
security of goods and persons remain relatively low in Sub-Saharan Africa (Institutional Profiles 
Database, 2012). This can explain why private security guards are generally present in front of 
the buildings in well-off urban areas of the region. Fulfilling the headquarters demand proved 
problematic for the subsidiary because it was impossible to enter the residential buildings of their 
target group (i.e. the wealthier population) to distribute flyers, as illustrated by the following 
quote: 
‘Mary [subsidiary general manager] went to talk to security men of two buildings next to 
where she lives. Apparently, they won’t allow us to do that. I am not surprised: in the 
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building where I live, there are always two guards and a dog, and they don’t let you in 
unless they recognize your face. Since every single building we would target is guarded, 
we’ll need to think of something a bit different.’ – Participant-observation notes, week 10 
After internal discussions with managers from a sister subsidiary, it was decided that the 
flyers would be distributed inside hotels and not apartment buildings. Thus, the initial response 
of the subsidiary was to combine elements from the headquarters demands and from the local 
environment (selective coupling response). However, new problems arose as the subsidiary 
managers were trying to implement the selective coupling response. Indeed, the subsidiary could 
not find any intermediary that could produce the door-hangers. Difficulties in finding specialized 
intermediaries are characteristic for Sub-Saharan Africa (see George et al., 2016) and the 
subsidiary did not manage to overcome this challenge. Eventually, the subsidiary managers 
followed a dismissal tactic and ignored the demand (non-compliance response). Our data did not 
indicate that the headquarters challenged this decision. 
Case 5. As part of the global marketing campaign, the headquarters requested the subsidiary 
to send them high resolution logos of the partner restaurants to include them in the billboard 
posters which had been designed in the headquarters. The subsidiary faced several problems 
when asking the restaurants to give them their logos, as illustrated by the quotes below:  
‘One restaurant manager […] told me I needed to ask the designer she had contracted. It 
took some time to get her to give me the number. I called, but the person told me this has 
been done many years ago so they did not have the file anymore.’ – Participant-observation 
notes, week 18  
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‘A restaurant owner told me he wasn’t sure whether he should give me his logo on file or 
not because he had been accused of copying the logo from a chain in America.’ – 
Participant-observation notes, week 18  
The initial response of the subsidiary was to send only about half of the requested logos to the 
headquarters, thus following a pacifying tactic (compromise response). However, during 
subsequent negotiations with the headquarters, the subsidiary tried to influence the headquarters 
managers by asking them to use their designer team to create the missing electronic versions of 
the logos.  
‘Apparently, the designer in Berlin is too busy so we need to see with the designer in 
Nigeria. This is getting annoying because I know that it will take forever to get this from 
the Nigerian team because they have many pending requests and they are doing this kind 
of stuff for the whole continent. This is very frustrating. It will probably delay our 
billboard launch.’ – Participant-observation notes, week 19 
Eventually, the control tactic was successful and the subsidiary transferred the headquarters 
request to the Nigerian designer team, who had to create new high-resolution electronic versions 
of the logos for all the partner restaurants (manipulation response).  
Case 6. The ordering system in place since the establishment of the subsidiary was such that 
to place an order the customers had to call the subsidiary, which would then call the restaurant to 
order the meals. After a few months of activity and in the search for optimization, the 
headquarters requested that all the subsidiaries push their clients to place their orders directly 
online rather than by phone. Thus, the headquarters requested that the subsidiary delete its phone 
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number from all communication materials. The first response adopted by the subsidiary was a 
dismissal tactic, as the subsidiary managers estimated that most of their customers were not 
willing or able to use the online platform to place their orders (non-compliance response). In 
fact, despite important developments, recent studies estimate that the share of the population 
connected to the Internet in Sub-Saharan Africa is lagging compared to other regions (Manyika 
et al., 2013). 
‘Mary [subsidiary general manager] didn’t seem to agree with Larry’s [headquarters 
manager] idea […]. She told me that a lot of our good clients only had our phone number, 
and that they refuse to use the site because either they don’t have internet or they don’t 
really want to start looking at it because they don’t know how to use it. She thinks we 
should keep it there and not plan to move it out.’ – Participant-observation notes, week 7 
Later on, the headquarters came back to the subsidiary asking why their demand had not been 
implemented and insisted that this should be done rapidly.  
‘I talked to Mary [subsidiary general manager] about removing the phone number from 
the flyers. She had already been informed by Larry [headquarters manager]that we should 
do that pretty soon […] In the end we thought we could probably move the number [away] 
from different ads online, while leaving it on some of our flyers.’ – Participant-observation 
notes, week 15 
Eventually, the second tactic following headquarters’ demand was pacifying as the subsidiary 
partly deleted the phone numbers from some of the materials while continuing to take orders 
from clients who called the subsidiary (compromise response). To illustrate the reluctance of 
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clients to place their orders online, most of the clients using the website chat asked where to find 
the phone number of the subsidiary. 
Case 7. Facing contract enforcement problems, the subsidiary had difficulties retrieving the 
commissions that the restaurants were supposed to pay at the end of each month. In fact, some of 
the restaurants would not agree to pay, not even some with which the subsidiary had a written 
contract. Consequently, the headquarters requested that the subsidiary appoints a cash collector 
and terminate the partnership with the restaurants that were still not willing to pay their 
commissions.  
‘Several restaurants have been extremely problematic for us. They are very famous and 
attract a large number of clients. […] when we send the cash collector, he [the cash 
collector] says they don’t want to pay and they threaten to leave the system. We don’t want 
that, since they bring a lot of new clients, and we have been told by the headquarters that 
client acquisition was one of our priorities right now.’ – Participant-observation notes, 
week 8 
The initial response of the subsidiary was to appoint a cash collector as requested by the 
headquarters, but did it not terminate the relationships with the restaurants which did not pay 
their commissions, as requested by the local partners (selective coupling response). Later on, 
the subsidiary influenced the headquarters and manipulated the demand, turning it into 
collecting the meals from the restaurants without paying them directly but rather every two 
weeks and after deducting the commission fees (manipulation response).  
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Case 8.  The headquarters wanted to implement the use of Salesforce (a software used to track 
sales) in all the African subsidiaries of the MNC. One aspect of the implementation was that the 
subsidiary had to upload a signed contract for each of the partnerships they had. However, the 
subsidiary had not signed contracts with a lot of their partners. This can be explained by the fact 
that informal economy practices are widespread in the region, and that verbal agreements are 
predominant (African Development Bank, 2013).  
‘I was going through the papers today and only found about 60% of the paper versions of 
the contracts I needed. After a while, Mary [subsidiary general manager] told me that 
some restaurants did not have contracts because we had verbal agreement. That was a bit 
of a shock for me, but she explained that many restaurants didn’t want to sign contracts, 
and that she tried to get them to sign, but each time she went, they refused.’ – Participant-
observation week 6 
Initially, the subsidiary decided not to upload any of the contracts and followed a challenging 
tactic (non-compliance response). As the headquarters were monitoring the implementation of 
this demand across the different subsidiaries, they saw that the Ivorian subsidiary was not 
complying with it. Later, the headquarters came back to enforce compliance and as the 
subsidiary was arguing that it had verbal agreements with 40% of the partners, one manager from 
the headquarters sent the following e-mail:  




The subsidiary managers started uploading the contracts that were available but eventually 
stopped pushing for signing with the reluctant partners. Pacifying with all actors and partially 
complying with all demands, the subsidiary eventually followed a compromise response. 
‘I went to see one of the Chinese restaurants and the manager told me to come back 
around four times. He never signed, and we kept him on the website. Mary [subsidiary 
general manager] went to see some of the other problematic restaurants with the same 
results. After seeing our results, we didn’t go any further – we were wasting too much 
time.’ – Participant-observation notes, week 8 
Intended dynamism in the response processes  
Case 9. In order to improve operational efficiency, the headquarters wanted to implement a 
new ordering system that would automatically send the order to the restaurants once it had been 
registered by the subsidiary in the system. The headquarters wanted the subsidiary to ask the 
restaurants to use an ordering device, similar to a fax machine. There were several problematic 
aspects in the demand. First, the headquarters requested that the partner restaurants bear the costs 
of the machine. Second, the machines had to be ordered to the headquarters by bulk of nine. 
Third and most importantly, most restaurants were not willing to use a hardware that was new to 
them. As there were only three restaurants willing to use the new hardware, the subsidiary 
initially decided to postpone their reaction to the headquarters demand.  
‘So we decided to wait until our service was better known and that more modern 
restaurants would join the network.’ – Participant-observation notes, week 4 
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A few months later, the subsidiary general manager considered that enough new modern and 
more tech-savvy restaurants had been added to the portfolio to get back to this headquarters 
demand. Although more restaurants were willing to use the machine, few wanted to cover the 
costs. As a response, the subsidiary combined different elements of the demands (selective 
coupling response), as illustrated by the following quotes:   
‘Lisa, who deals with operation at the headquarters, insisted that we make the restaurant 
pay for part of the system.  Since we already had issues getting restaurants to pay their 
commissions, this was seen, both by me and Mary [subsidiary general manager], as the 
tricky part. We tried to do a quick study of the restaurants to see who would like the idea 
and those that would be willing to pay for it and the results weren’t great.’ – Participant-
observation notes, week 14 
‘We adapted a bit the model so we could make it more acceptable for the local restaurants 
[…] there is no monthly engagement, there is no monthly fee, or anything like that.’ – 
Interview Mary [subsidiary general manager] 
Case 10. The headquarters required that the subsidiary implement a new payment method 
in which they pay the restaurants every two weeks and after deducting the commission fees 
(see case 7). Initially and despite the fact that the subsidiary managers had participated in the 
negotiations that led to this demand, they were not confident about how they could sell this 
payment method in an effective way to their partner restaurants. Observance of contractual 
terms remains relatively low in the Sub-Saharan region (Institutional Profiles Database, 2012) 
and the subsidiary managers feared that their partners would not trust them enough to accept 
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the new payment method. Their first response was to test it with a few partners to see how 
they would react and then potentially change the way they approached the restaurants with 
this new method.  
 ‘I think Mary [subsidiary general manager] wants to try it out. […] The local staff seems 
to say that it’s a good idea if you convince the restaurants’– Participant-observation notes, 
week 22 
After the testing phase, the subsidiary managers realized that it was easier to implement 
than they had anticipated, and decided to fully comply with the headquarters demand with all 
their partners, as illustrated by the following quote.  
‘We went to see the first restaurants and then when we realized that it was easy to 
convince them, we decided to deploy the strategy on all restaurants.’ – Interview Mary 
[subsidiary general manager] 
Case 11. As part of the global marketing campaign, the headquarters had prepared billboard 
designs and requested all their subsidiaries to organize the launch of these designs at the same 
time. However, the regulatory system in Cote d’Ivoire is such that the billboard designs have to 
be developed by local certified agencies and then approved by an official advertisement 
committee. It was difficult to find a local agency willing to cooperate (i.e. pretend that they 
developed the design suggested by the headquarters) and to get the approval by the committee 
before the deadline set up by the headquarters. The subsidiary postponed the demand because it 
needed additional information on local agencies and on the committee. It could not comply with 
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the headquarters demand on time and the launch of the marketing campaign had to be delayed. 
Later on, one of the subsidiary managers was able to draw on a personal connection to accelerate 
the process and the subsidiary succeeded in finding a local agency and receiving the approval by 
the committee. Thus, the subsidiary eventually complied with the headquarters directive. 
Case 12. Here, the headquarters wanted the subsidiary to source customized pizza delivery 
boxes to increase brand recognition and acquire new customers. In particular, they requested that 
the subsidiary finds information on the most popular materials and on potential suppliers and 
quotes. The difficulty of finding specialized intermediaries made it difficult for the subsidiary to 
comply with the headquarters demand.  
‘Where are we supposed to find a supplier that has a warehouse and a developed chain of 
distribution here in a week’s time? I’m feeling a bit annoyed by these suggestions and I 
have no idea where to start from.’ – Participant-observation notes, week 14 
‘I contacted several printing firms that the team knew about and they’ve sent me some 
quotes. Everything is much more expensive than what the headquarters recommends in its 
template. I called Martin [headquarters marketing manager] to ask him about that and he 
says I need to find a printing shop that uses a technique called ‘flexo’ printing. He also 
told us that we should keep the quantity of boxes under a 100 because we need to run a 
pilot phase. […] I called the suppliers again to check whether they could do this type of 
printing and they all of them said they didn’t have the machine to do this. I negotiated with 
one of the suppliers to lower the price but he proposed to augment the quantity from 100 to 
500 boxes – which is way too many for Martin. The guidelines they sent us simply do not fit 
the reality.’ – Participant-observation notes, week 20 
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Eventually, the subsidiary negotiated with the supplier to lower the number to 200 boxes, and 
at a lower price than what the headquarters had recommended. In sum, after postponing for about 
four weeks, the subsidiary followed a bargaining tactic (compromise).  
 
DISCUSSION 
In this study, we looked at the response processes that MNC subsidiaries go through when faced 
with conflicting demands emanating from their headquarters. Our research context was a Sub-
Saharan African e-commerce firm headquartered in Europe. This context allowed us to 
investigate conflicting demands to which it might be particularly difficult to respond, due to 
significant differences in both contexts, not only in terms of institutions, but also in terms of 
industry characteristics. We collected participant-observation data through the dual role (research 
and manager) as one of the managers involved in the response process, and data from subsequent 
semi-structured interviews with the other managers also involved in responding to conflicting 
demands. We conducted a multiple-case analysis with the subsidiary response process as our 
level of analysis.  
Our findings show that in the cases in which it was relatively clear that compliance with the 
headquarters demand would have harmed external legitimacy, the subsidiary took a locally 
appropriate response, such as non-compliance or a decoupling that was sustainable, at least 
during our data collection period. In other cases, the response process was dynamic and an initial 
response was followed by another one. When the subsidiary managers were unsure whether it 
was possible to comply with the headquarters demand, they actively postponed their response in 
order to search for additional information and/or to negotiate with internal or external actors. 
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When the subsidiary managers were motivated to comply with the demand, but unsure about 
how to do so, they tested the compliance with a limited number of local partners and then 
decided on a subsequent response. In each of these two response processes of postponing and 
testing, the dynamism of the process was intended by the subsidiary managers. In other words, 
they decided for postponing or testing with the intention of adopting a subsequent response. We 
also found cases in which the dynamism was (unintentionally) emerging from internal or 
external pressures after a first response was taken. In these cases, the subsidiary managers 
adopted a response that they thought would satisfy all actors. However, these actors later 
pressured the subsidiary managers to adopt a different response. This is consistent with the idea 
that strategy can either be realized as intended or as emergent, i.e. realized in the absence of 
intentions (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985).  
Below, we detail our contributions to the literature on organizational responses to conflicting 
demands (e.g. Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010; 2013), to the literature on institutional 
duality (e.g. Kostova and Roth, 2002; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999), and to our understanding of 
the management of e-commerce subsidiaries in Africa (e.g. Brenner and Ambos, 2013; Kostova, 
Nell and Hoenen, 2016; Narula, 2014).  
Organizational responses to conflicting demands  
Pache and Santos (2013) recently showed that organizations sometimes selectively couple intact 
elements from different demands. Along these lines, we show that this is a response category that 




Furthermore, we also build upon the recent contribution of Crilly, Zollo and Hansen (2012) 
who showed that decoupling as a response to institutional pressures can be either intentional or 
emergent. Our findings indicate that the dynamism in the response process was sometimes 
intended by the subsidiary managers, and sometimes emerging from internal or external actors. 
For example, case 8 highlights the internal pressures from headquarters to adopt a new response 
to the initial demand. If the headquarters had not insisted, the subsidiary would not have adopted 
another response and hence there would not have been any dynamism in this response process. 
Case 9 shows how the subsidiary managers responded by postponing and with the intention of 
adopting another response later on, which they did. Thus, we are able to depict the dynamism of 
the response process as well as its sources.  
Most research on organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands assumes that 
responses are single and sustainable, and thus neglect the possibility that organizations adjust 
their responses over time (Greenwood et al., 2011). Recently, Tilcsik (2010) and Raaijmakers et 
al. (2015) started a discussion on the role of time and dynamism in the response process to 
conflicting demands. We extend this discussion in two ways.  
First, our findings suggest that organizations can take time and postpone or test their reactions 
to a conflicting demand. Similar to Raaijmakers et al. (2015), we found that time was used as a 
resource for action (e.g. negotiation or information search) and also as a buffering resource. In 
case 12, the headquarters requested that the subsidiary source customized delivery boxes and the 
subsidiary postponed its reaction to the demand in order to look for additional information about 
the different suppliers and to negotiate with them. The subsidiary postponed for about four 
weeks before getting back to the headquarters managers. In case 9, the subsidiary managers were 
told by the headquarters to implement a new ordering system. As only a few of their local 
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partners were willing to use a new technology, the subsidiary decided to wait until they managed 
to add more modern and tech-savvy partners to their portfolio. In other words, the subsidiary 
managers actively delayed their response to the demand (approximately ten weeks) in order to 
wait for the institutional complexity to resolve.  
Second, while Tilcsik (2010) showed that a compliance response can follow a decoupling one, 
we found evidence for a much greater variety of possibilities of sequences in response processes 
(see Figure 1). For example, in case 6, a non-compliance response was followed by a 
compromise one; in case 4, a selective coupling was followed by non-compliance. These two 
cases illustrate that after an initial response is chosen, a new situation can arise in which internal 
(e.g. headquarters) or external (e.g. suppliers) actors may not be satisfied, thus leading to the 
need of another subsequent response. Building on Tilcsik’s (2010) findings, we can even suggest 
that any response can trigger internal and / or external pressures that eventually lead to another 
response  of any category of the current typology. Furthermore, this cycle is not limited to two 
responses, but as cases 7 and 10 suggest, this cycle can go up to four and potentially more until 
all actors are satisfied.  
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
The typology of organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands has not been 
developed extensively since Oliver’s (1991) publication. In fact, to our knowledge, the single 
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attempt to extend this classification is the study of Pache and Santos (2013) and their addition of 
the selective coupling response. With our study, we extend and modify this classification by 
adding two response categories and by highlighting their potentially (or necessarily) temporary 
nature. Our findings suggest that organizations postpone or test their response with the intention 
of adopting a subsequent response. These two response categories of postponing and testing are 
temporary responses by nature, because they will always be followed by another response. 
Indeed, if the organization decides to postpone and does not adopt a new response, the ultimate 
response will eventually become non-compliance. Also, in the case that an organization decides 
to test complying with the demand with a few partners and does not decide to change this 
response, the ultimate response will eventually become compromise. Similarly, we may question 
the sustainable character of the manipulation response. In our case 7, the subsidiary followed a 
selective coupling response that the headquarters disapproved and the outcome of additional 
negotiations was a manipulation response in which the subsidiary altered the initial demand. 
When responding to this altered demand, the subsidiary followed a testing response before 
eventually complying with the demand. This shows that since the manipulation response has the 
aim to change the demand (Oliver, 1991), the organization will have to think about how to 
respond to this altered demand, thus a new response should follow.  
We propose to modify the current typology of organizational responses to conflicting 
demands in order to differentiate between potentially and necessarily temporary responses. The 
necessarily temporary responses are postponing, testing, and manipulation; the potentially 
temporary responses are compliance, compromise, decoupling, selective coupling, and non-
compliance. This extended and modified classification might inform us better about the response 
process that organizations deploy when faced with conflicting institutional demands.   
36 
 
Institutional theory in the study of MNCs 
We also contribute to the literature applying institutional theory to the study of MNCs (e.g. 
Kostova and Roth, 2002; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Nell et al., 2015). First, we find empirical 
evidence for the proposition made by Durand and Jacqueminet (2015) that MNC subsidiaries 
might try to address conflicting demands with ‘recourse to a range of responses beyond practice 
implementation, such as compromise, avoidance, defiance, or manipulation’ (Durand and 
Jacqueminet, 2015: 931). Indeed, while most of the literature applying institutional theory to the 
study of MNC subsidiary reactions to conflicting demands has considered decoupling and 
(non-)compliance (see Egels-Zanden, 2014; Kostova and Roth, 2002), we show that when 
internal (external) pressures for conformity (non-conformity) with the headquarters demands are 
high, subsidiaries are likely to follow compromise or selective coupling to satisfy both internal 
and external actors.  
Second, our study provides insights into how to reconnect old- and new-institutionalism (see 
Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997; Kostova et al., 2008). We retain the new-institutionalism premise 
that organizational success depends on more than just ‘technical efficiency and that these other 
factors are essentially socially constructed’ (Kostova et al., 2008: 1002). However, instead of 
static fields, we see dynamic ones that are the product of continuous interactions. In particular, 
we found that the initial response of MNC subsidiaries to a conflicting demand emanating from 
their headquarters influenced the field and led to subsequent negotiations that sometimes 
required adjustments to the initial response. For example, in case 7, the headquarters required 
that the subsidiary appoint a cash collector to request the partner restaurants to pay the bills from 
the subsidiary and to terminate the relationships with the ones who still did not want to pay. The 
subsidiary did appoint a cash collector but this proved inefficient in forcing the restaurants to pay 
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and the MNC had to reassess the field in order to find out a new solution.  Also, the manipulation 
response in case 7 led to a new situation of institutional duality that the subsidiary had to assess 
before responding to it. Through the constant negotiations that the subsidiary had with internal 
and external actors, we offer empirical evidence to a recent argument made by Nell and 
colleagues (2015), i.e. that the isomorphism-based either-or logic is less appropriate to the study 
of MNC subsidiaries than a logic of active negotiation and social construction to reach and 
maintain legitimacy.   
Interestingly, we found that the headquarters sometimes let go when they understand that 
complying with their demands would make it difficult for the subsidiary to manage their external 
legitimacy. In cases 1, 3, and 4, while the subsidiary did not comply with the headquarters 
demands, their responses were not contested by the headquarters. This suggests that headquarters 
can learn from the legitimacy requirements of their subsidiaries’ contexts. This enables us to 
highlight conditions under which non-compliance with the headquarters demand will not harm 
internal legitimacy. While the subsidiaries studied by Kostova and Roth (2002) had to comply 
with the headquarters demand, our subsidiary had more agency, which enabled us to see that 
subsidiaries can also manage their internal legitimacy when non-compliance is the only option 
that is locally valid. However, when headquarters do not understand the external pressures, it 
will be more difficult for subsidiaries to get away with non-compliance. To illustrate, in case 8, 
the headquarters did not (want to) understand why the subsidiary could not sign contracts with 
their local partners and that local agreements were made with most of them. Therefore, the 
headquarters contested the initial non-compliance response and the subsidiary eventually 
compromised.  
Foreign e-commerce subsidiaries in Africa 
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Our findings enrich our understanding of how e-commerce multinationals manage their 
relationships with subsidiaries located on the African continent. More and more e-commerce 
firms entering the African continent are attracted by double-digit growth prospects (Manyika et 
al., 2013; The New Yorker, 2016). These foreign firms in the e-commerce sector have a global 
mindset, in which success lies in the scalability of operations. However, organizations still face 
and need to overcome a number of challenges to succeed in the e-commerce sector (George et 
al., 2016). Taking into consideration the African-specific challenges of internet penetration, 
online payments, and delivery systems are crucial for e-commerce firms.  
We enrich our knowledge about the management of MNC subsidiaries in the e-commerce 
sector in Africa by showing that foreign headquarters managers sometimes have difficulties in 
grasping local particularities, and come up with demands that are hard to comply with for 
subsidiaries. In some of our cases, the headquarters showed a lack of understanding of the 
subsidiary’s environment. For example in case 6, where the headquarters managers pushed for 
more online ordering, they were over-estimating internet access and willingness to pay online. 
This lack of local knowledge often leads to conflicting headquarters demands that can undermine 
local activities and subsidiary managers can, for example, become frustrated by headquarters 
demands that are at odds with the local context (see case 8). Narula (2014) suggests that one of 
the firm-specific assets that provide MNCs with an advantage over other firms relates to the 
knowledge of institutions. Building this firm-specific asset is a long process and nascent MNCs, 
such as the one we investigated, might be relatively weak when it comes to accurately 
understanding institutions and local market specificities.  
Brenner and Ambos (2013) suggested that when headquarters introduce a control mechanism 
that is ‘contested’ by the subsidiary’s environment, it will lack credibility. To be successful, 
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headquarters must institutionalize this mechanism (Brenner and Ambos, 2013; Kostova and 
Roth, 2002). Our findings add to this discussion in that the headquarters demands that were 
highly conflicting with the local context (e.g. cases 1, 3, 6, or 8) had not been institutionalized 
yet and the initial response of the subsidiary was to not comply with it. The institutionalization of 
practices in MNCs takes time and it can be that headquarters of young MNCs will have more 
difficulties to push for top-down implementation in their subsidiaries.  
Kostova, Nell and Hoenen (2016) started an interesting discussion and suggested that 
subsidiaries located in countries with less developed formal institutions are more likely to follow 
a subsidiary-focused institutional logic and behave in an unpredictable way. We extend this 
discussion by showing that subsidiaries respond by decoupling when non-compliance with the 
headquarters demand is easy to hide (see case 2), they actively try to manipulate the headquarters 
to alter the demand (see cases 5 and 7), or even simply dismiss their demands (see cases 4, 6, and 
8). This subsidiary-centered behavior might be more frequent in subsidiaries that are located far 
away and in cultural or institutional distant countries as Kostova et al. (2016) suggest, thus 
making it even more challenging for e-commerce firm to manage their African subsidiaries.  
For MNCs with headquarters that have little experience in handling foreign institutions 
(Narula, 2014), that have not institutionalized practices yet (Brenner and Ambos, 2013), and that 
manage subsidiaries located in distant countries with less developed formal institutions (Kostova 
et al., 2016), situations of institutional duality are likely to occur. These situations will be 
particularly challenging to address for e-commerce subsidiaries as the overall institutional and 
industrial logic of their headquarters differs significantly from the one in which the subsidiaries 
is active. If headquarters do not learn fast about local characteristics and do not leave room for 
more adaptation, frictions and frustration (see case 8) are likely to occur in the subsidiaries. As 
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the recent example of CDiscount in Cameroon and Senegal suggests, managing institutional 
duality is crucial for the survival of foreign e-commerce firms in Africa.  
Practical implications 
How MNC subsidiaries respond to headquarters demands is a relevant question for MNC top 
managers. It is not obvious that headquarters managers anticipate that their demands will conflict 
with the local requirements of the subsidiary’s context. Being aware of this eventuality is a first 
step in managing relationships with subsidiaries in a more efficient way. In addition, 
headquarters managers must know that their subsidiaries might need time to react to their 
demands, because they need to look for additional information or negotiate. Particularly in 
uncertain environments, headquarters managers must not underestimate the time needed by the 
subsidiaries to react to headquarters demands. We recommend including a buffer in the 
implementation schedule to control for these effects. In addition, headquarters managers must 
not assume that their subsidiaries will always comply with the headquarters demands, especially 
for subsidiaries located far away and / or in different institutional contexts. This is particularly 
relevant for Western MNCs operating in emerging markets and developing countries. We advise 
headquarters managers to be prepared to negotiate with their subsidiaries not only before the 
subsidiary responds to the demand, but also afterwards and in case the subsidiary responded in a 
way that is not consistent with what the headquarters expected. 
Limitations and future research 
Our study opens up interesting avenues for future research. First, we have showed that the 
response process to conflicting institutional demands can be dynamic in that a second response 
follows the initial one taken by the subsidiary. Doing so, we are able to suggest different possible 
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response processes that organizations can follow when faced with conflicting demands (see 
Figure 1). In case 8, the headquarters did not want to understand why the subsidiary did not 
comply with their demand and this led to a compromise response. In other cases, the 
headquarters understood that non-compliance was the only option and did not question it. Yet, it 
was outside of the scope of our study to look into when particular processes are likely to occur. 
In particular, future research could investigate the situations under which sequences such as 
decoupling-compliance, manipulation-non-compliance are most likely to happen. This would 
enrich our theoretical understanding of the dynamic response process.  
Second, we extended the typology of organizational responses to conflicting institutional 
demands by adding two response categories (postponing and testing). This enhances our 
comprehension of the role of time and dynamism in the response process to conflicting demand. 
While we have focused on broader response categories, future research could look into the 
details of such responses and provide us with interesting insights about the different tactics that 
are used within the postponing and testing responses.  
Third, our research context was a subsidiary located in Sub-Saharan Africa and headquartered 
in Europe. This context was particularly useful to research conflicting demands and the reactions 
to them, especially because of the industry. While we are still able to generalize to other contexts 
in which the headquarters and subsidiary contexts differ substantially on different aspects, future 
research could consider studying institutional duality in different conflicting contexts. For 
example, using subsidiaries located in developed markets and headquartered in emerging 
economies might push our theoretical understanding of reactions to situations of institutional 
duality in different directions (see Cuerzo-Cazzura, 2012 and Narula, 2012).  
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Fourth, we had several cases in which reactions to headquarters demands were delayed and 
potentially led to negative performance implications (see case 11 for the delayed global 
marketing campaign). However, the focus of our study did not allow us to consider performance-
related implications. Future studies could focus on the impact of the frequency and / or extent of 
conflicting institutional demands on subsidiary and MNC performance.  
CONCLUSION 
This study expands our understanding of the response process followed by MNC subsidiaries 
that are faced with conflicting institutional demands. Our findings show that the response process 
can be dynamic and that the dynamics are emergent in some cases and intended in others. We 
based our study on the institutional complexity literature (e.g. Kostova and Roth, 2002; Oliver, 
1991; Pache and Santos, 2010, 2013) and make several contributions that we believe are valuable 
to this stream of research. 
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TABLES AND FIGURE 
Table 1. Organizational responses to institutional duality 
Response Definition and similar concepts Degree of Compliance 
Compliance  Compliance with institutional demands. Also referred to as 








Manipulation Attempt to influence the sources of the demands in order to 
alter them (Oliver, 1991). 
 
 
Decoupling Attempt to preclude necessity of complying with institutional 
demands. Also referred to as ceremonial adoption (Kostova 





Combination of intact elements from different conflicting 
demands (Pache and Santos, 2013). 
 
 
Non-Compliance Non-compliance with the demand(s). Also referred to as 
defiance (Oliver, 1991). 
 
 
Table 2. Participation-observation phases 
Participation/Observation 
types Exploratory months Following months 
Participation/Observation of 
institutional characteristics of 
local environment 
- Acquaintance with local employees 
- Daily routines, such as transportation 
in rain season, negotiations in the street 
- Dialect learning and conversing 
- Learning working tools and local 
organization  
- Formal and informal sales 
negotiations, ranging in the business 
setting 
- Participation in local cultural events, 
informal lunches with employees 
- Participation in conflict solving at the 
local level between local employees 
 
Participation/Observation of 
institutional characteristics of 
MNC environment 
- Attending Skype meetings with 
headquarter representatives 
- Training with headquarters 
representatives 
- Meeting with the local team 
 
- Direction of Skype meetings with 
headquarters representatives 
- Discussions on best practice reports 
around the globe 
- Meeting with managers and 
employees of other African subsidiaries 
 
Participation/Observation of 
institutional duality situations 
- Observation of Operations and 
Offline Marketing 
- Observed the initial structure 
- Observation of human resource 
management practices 
- Participation in sales activities, 
partner Management, operations, 
offline and online marketing 
- Observed the increase in team size - 







Table 3. Overview of cases of conflicting institutional demands 
 
Case Headquarters demand Conflicting local characteristics Response 1 Response 2
1
Use GPS technology to help and track delivery 
staff  
Delivery and office staff do not read maps Non-compliance -
2 Sign contracts with fast-food restaurants first
Transport infrastructure makes it very inefficient to focus on 
category instead of location 
Decoupling -
3 Include wine dealers in the partners portfolio
Half of the delivery staff expressed embarrassment as their 
religion does not permit alcohol delivery
Non-compliance -
4 Distribute flyers in the shape of door-hangers Entrance to apartment buildings restricted by security guards Selective coupling Non-compliance
5 Send logos from partner restaurants




Delete phone number from all communication 
materials to force online ordering




Appoint a cash collector and terminate 
partnership with restaurants who still did not pay
Cash collector system is not credible to the partner restaurants Selective coupling Manipulation
8
Upload signed contracts with all partner 
restaurants
Verbal agreements are more common than written contracts Non-compliance Compromise
9
Rent machines to the restaurants to automize 
order placing 
Low adaptability to new technology Postponing Selective coupling
10
Pay the partners with a two weeks delay and 
deduct commission fees 
Difficulties in knowing how to sell this demand to the partners Testing Compliance
11
Organize launch of headquarters-designed 
billboard campaign
Local regulations require billboard designs to be developed by 
certified agencies and approved by governmental committee
Postponing Compliance




Figure 1. The dynamic response process to conflicting institutional demands 
